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Abstract—We consider a two user fading Multiple Access
Channel with a wire-tapper (MAC-WT) where the transmitter
has the channel state information (CSI) to the intended receiver
but not to the eavesdropper (eve). We provide an achievable
secrecy sum-rate with power control. We next provide a secrecy
sum-rate with power control and cooperative jamming (CJ).
We also study an achievable secrecy sum rate by employing an
ON/OFF power control scheme which is more easily computable.
Finally we employ CJ over this power control scheme. Results
show that CJ boosts the secrecy sum-rate significantly even if
we do not know the CSI of the eve’s channel. At high SNR, the
secrecy sum-rate (with CJ) without CSI of the eve exceeds the
secrecy sum-rate (without CJ) with full CSI of the eve.
Index Terms—Channel state information, Cooperative jam-
ming, Fading Channel, Multiple Access Channel, Secrecy sum-
rate, Wire-tap channel
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is one of the most important considerations in
transmission of information from one user to another. It
involves confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation [1]. We will be concerned about confidentiality.
This guarantees that the legitimate users successfully receive
the information intended for them while any eavesdropper is
not able to interpret this information. We will be concerned
with the eavesdroppers who are passive attackers, e.g., they
attempt to interpret the transmitted information without inject-
ing any new information or trying to modify the information
transmitted.
Traditional techniques to achieve confidentiality in this setup
are based on cryptographic encryption ([2], [3]). However now,
Information Theoretical Security is also being actively studied
([1], [4]). This does not require the secret/public keys used
in cryptographic techniques. Key management, especially for
wireless channels can be very challenging. Also, information
theoretic security unlike the cryptography based techniques
can provide provably secure communication. Information the-
oretic security can also be used in a system in addition to
cryptographic techniques to add additional layers of protection
to the information transmission or to achieve key agreement
and/or distribution.
The Information theoretic approach for secrecy systems was
first investigated by Shannon [5] in 1949. Wyner [6] considers
communicating a secret over a wiretap channel in the form of
degraded broadcast channels, without using a key. Wyner’s
work was in turn extended by Leung and Hellman [7] to the
Gaussian channel. Csisza`r and Ko¨rner [8] considers a general
discrete memoryless broadcast channel, and shows that the
secrecy capacity is positive if the main channel to the intended
user is more capable than of the eavesdropper, and zero if the
wiretapper’s channel is less noisy. Secrecy capacity of MIMO
(Multiple Input Multiple Output) channels was obtained in [9],
[10] and [11]. In [12], an artificial noise concept is proposed
for MIMO channels to enhance the secrecy rate even when
the eavesdropper’s channel is better than the main channel. In
[13], this result has been extended to the case where no CSI
of the eavesdropper is available. The fading channel is studied
in [14] where power allocation schemes without CSI of the
eavesdropper’s channel to the transmitter are also obtained. In
[15], a wire-tap channel with slow fading is studied where
an outage analysis with full CSI of the eavesdropper and
imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper is performed. Practical
codes for the single user wire-tap channel were first reported in
[16]. Liang et al.[17] have studied a broadcast channel with a
wire-tapper. Interference channels with confidential messages
are studied in [18].
The first results in information theoretic security for a
Multiple Access Channel (MAC) were obtained in [19] and
[20]. In [19], each user treats the other as an eavesdropper
while in [20], the eavesdropper is at the receiving end. In
[21], Yener and Tekin propose a technique called cooperative
jamming in which a user that is not transmitting, can send
a jamming signal so that the eavesdropper is more confused.
This significantly improves the secrecy rate region. A fading
MAC was also studied by Yener and Tekin [22], where they
assume that the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel is perfectly
known at the transmitting users. In [23], Bassily and Ulukus
have proposed Ergodic Secret Alignment to further improve
the secrecy sum-rate region of the MAC with an eavesdropper.
In this paper, we consider a fading MAC-WT assuming no
CSI of the eavesdropper at the transmitting users. Since the
eavesdropper may not transmit any signal (it is passive), the
transmitters often will not know its channel. We obtain a power
control scheme that maximizes the sum secrecy rate and then
also employ cooperative jamming over this scheme. It will
be shown that cooperative jamming can significantly increase
the secrecy rate. But these policies are difficult to compute.
Thus, next we consider a computationally simpler ON/OFF
power control policy. We obtain its thresholds to maximize
the secrecy sum-rate. Finally, we also incorporate cooperative
jamming over this power control policy. With this, at high
SNR, the secrecy sum-rate exceeds the sum-rate when CSI of
the eavesdropper is perfectly known at the transmitter but the
cooperative jamming is not used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we define the channel model and state the problem. In
Section III, we obtain the power control policy with and
without cooperative jamming. Section IV discusses ON/OFF
power control policy with and without cooperative jamming.
In Section V, we compare the different policies numerically.
Finally in Section VI, we conclude this paper and discuss the
future work.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a system with two users who want to communi-
cate over a fading MAC to a legitimate receiver. There is also
an eavesdropper who is trying to get access to the output re-
ceived by the legitimate receiver. Transmitter k = 1, 2 chooses
message Wk for transmission from a set Wk = {1, 2, ...,Mk}
with uniform distribution. These messages are encoded into
{Xk,1, ..., Xk,n} using (2nRk , n) codes. The legitimate re-
ceiver gets Yi and the eavesdropper gets Zi at time i. The
decoder at the legitimate receiver estimates the transmitted
message as W˜ = (W˜1, W˜2) from Yn ≡ {Y1, ..., Yn}. The
legitimate receiver should receive the message reliably while
the eavesdropper should not be able to decode it. It is assumed
that the legitimate receiver as well as the eavesdropper know
the codebooks.
The channel model can be mathematically represented as:
Yi = h˜1,iX1,i + h˜2,iX2,i +NR,i (1)
Zi = g˜1,iX1,i + g˜2,iX2,i +NE,i (2)
where h˜k,i, g˜k,i are the complex channel gains from the
transmitter k to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
respectively. Also {NR,i} and {NE,i} are Complex additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) each with circularly symmet-
ric independent components distributed as N (0, 1), where
N (a, b) is Gaussian distribution with mean a and variance b.
Also we define |h˜k,i|2 = hk,i and |g˜k,i|2 = gk,i, for k = 1, 2.
We assume that {hk,i, i ≥ 1} and {gk,i, i ≥ 1} are indepen-
dent, identically distributed (iid), and that each sequence is
independent of the other (thus the channels experience flat,
fast fading). We also assume the power constraints:
1
n
n∑
i=1
X2ki ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2. (3)
The equivocation rate used in this paper is as defined in
[20]. We use collective secrecy constraint to take the multi-
access nature of the channel into account. Define
∆nL =
H(WL|Z
n)
H(WL)
(4)
where L ⊆ {1, 2}, Zn = (Z1, ..., Zn). For each n we need
codebooks such that the average probability of error to the
legitimate receiver goes to zero and ∆nL → 1 as n → ∞ for
each L ⊆ {1, 2}. Also let h = (h1, h2), g = (g1, g2), where
hi = |h˜i|2, gi = |g˜i|2, i = 1, 2 are exponentially distributed.
Then from [20], if the CSI hk, gk are known at both the
transmitters at time i, the secrecy rate region for this case is:
R1 ≤ Eh,g
{[
log
(1 + h1P1(h, g))(1 + g2P2(h, g))
1 + g1P1(h, g) + g2P2(h, g)
]+}
,
(5)
R2 ≤ Eh,g
{[
log
(1 + g1P1(h, g))(1 + h2P2(h, g))
1 + g1P1(h, g) + g2P2(h, g)
]+}
,
(6)
R1 +R2 ≤ Eh,g
{[
log
1 + h1P1(h, g) + h2P2(h, g)
1 + g1P1(h, g) + g2P2(h, g)
]+}
,
(7)
where P1(h, g) and P2(h, g) are the transmit powers satisfying
the constraint (3)and Gaussian signalling is used.
In [20], the optimal power allocation policy which maxi-
mizes the sum secrecy rate (7) has been found. In this paper,
we extend this result to the case when the CSI of the legitimate
receiver is known but the CSI of the eavesdropper may not be
known at the transmitter; only the distribution is known. Since
we are assuming a passive eavesdropper, this will often be a
more reasonable assumption, i.e., there is no transmission from
the eavesdropper to the transmitters for them to estimate its
channel.
III. POWER CONTROL WITH MAIN CSI ONLY
A. Power control without Cooperative Jamming
In this section we consider power control which maximizes
the sum secrecy rate when only the main channel (to the
legitimate user) CSI is known at the transmitters. Let Pk(h)
be the power used by a policy when the main channel gain is
h = (h1, h2). Of course, the policy should satisfy the average
power constraint (3). We need the following notation
φsp1,p2 = 1 + s1p1 + s2p2, (8)
where s is the channel state (h or g) and pk is the power used.
The following theorem can be proved as in [14].
Theorem 3.1: For a given power control policy
{Pk(h)}, k = 1, 2, the following secrecy sum-rate
Eh,g


[
log
(
φhP1,P2
φ
g
P1,P2
)]+
 (9)
is achievable.
The policy that maximizes (9) is not available in closed
form, but can be numerically computed (see Appendix). An
example will be provided in Section VI. We will also consider
a simpler ON/OFF power control policy which was employed
in [14] for a single user case.
Next we consider power control with cooperative jamming.
B. Power Control with Cooperative Jamming
The power policy obtained in the last section depends on
h = (h1, h2). If both the main channels h1 and h2 are
good, both the transmitters send their coded symbols. If a
transmitter’s channel is bad, it may not. In [21] and [22], it
is suggested that when a transmitter is not sending its data,
it can help the other user by jamming the channel to the
eavesdropper. We extend their result to our set-up.
Let {Pk(h)}, k = 1, 2, be the power control policy when
the users are transmitting and {Qk(h)}, k = 1, 2, be the power
control policy when the users are jamming. To satisfy (3), we
need
Eh[Pk(h) +Qk(h)] ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2. (10)
Then we have the following theorem
Theorem 3.2: With the above power control policies se-
crecy sum-rate
Eh,g


[
log
(
φhP1,P2 + φ
h
Q1,Q2
− 1
φ
g
P1,P2
+ φgQ1,Q2 − 1
)(
φ
g
Q1,Q2
φhQ1,Q2
)]+
 (11)
is achievable.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.1
We will obtain the power control policy that maximizes the
sum rate in the Appendix. We will see in Section VI that
cooperative jamming can significantly improve the sum-rate.
We also propose a simple ON/OFF power control policy
with cooperative jamming.
IV. FADING MAC WITH ON/OFF POWER CONTROL
The policy obtained in Section III can be computed only
numerically and its structure is not known. The following
ON/OFF policy is easier to compute and is intuitive:
User k transmits with a constant power Pk if hk ≥ τk,
where τk is an appropriate threshold. Hence the following
cases arise:
1) h1 ≥ τ1, h2 ≥ τ2 : Both transmit;
2) h1 ≥ τ1, h2 < τ2 : User-1 transmits;
3) h1 < τ1, h2 ≥ τ2 : User-2 transmits;
4) h1 < τ1, h2 < τ2 : No user transmits.
From average power constraint we get:
P¯1 = P1Pr(h1 ≥ τ1) (12)
and
P¯2 = P2Pr(h2 ≥ τ2). (13)
Let
A1 , {h1 ≥ τ1, h2 < τ2}, A2 , {h1 < τ1, h2 ≥ τ2}
and
A12 , {h1 > τ1, h2 > τ2} (14)
The secrecy sum-rate by this policy is given by
RB = Eh,g


[
log
(
φhP1,P2
φ
g
P1,P2
)
1A12
]+

+ Eh,g


[
log
(
φhP1,0
φ
g
P1,0
)
1A1
]+

+ Eh,g


[
log
(
φh0,P2
φ
g
0,P2
)
1A2
]+
 (15)
where 1A is the indicator function of set A.
When hk and gk, k = 1, 2 have exponential distributions
with independent components, with joint density of h and g
respectively given as:
f1(h) =
1
γh1 γ
h
2
e
−
h1
γh
1 e
−
h2
γh
2 , f2(g) =
1
γ
g
1γ
g
2
e
−
g1
γ
g
1 e
−
g2
γ
g
2 (16)
then
P1 = P¯1e
τ1
γ¯h
1 , P2 = P¯2e
τ2
γ¯h
2 (17)
We numerically obtain the secrecy sum-rate for thresholds
τ1 and τ2 which maximize sum-rate (15).
V. FADING MAC WITH ON/OFF POWER CONTROL AND
COOPERATIVE JAMMING
Cooperative jamming in section III B has been found
to increase the sum-rate substantially (see Fig 1 below).
Therefore, we now use it with the ON/OFF policy studied in
Section IV. A user when not transmitting its data jams the
channel for the eavesdropper. Also it transmits with different
powers taking into account the channel gain of the other user.
The following cases arise:
1) h1 ≥ τ1, h2 ≥ τ2 : Both transmit with power P1a, P2a;
2) h1 ≥ τ1, h2 < τ2 : User-1 transmits with power P1b,
user-2 jams with power Q2;
3) h1 < τ1, h2 ≥ τ2 : User-2 transmits with power P2b,
user-1 jams with power Q1;
4) h1 < τ1, h2 < τ2 : None transmits or jams.
The powers and the thresholds in the above scheme are
chosen to satisfy the average power constraints.
With this power control scheme, the secrecy sum-rate is
given by:
RCJB = Eh,g


[
log
(
φhP1a,P2a
φ
g
P1a,P2a
)
1A12
]+

+ Eh,g


[
log
(
φhP1b,Q2
φ
g
P1b,Q2
)
1A1
]+

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Control policies: With and without Cooperative Jamming
+ Eh,g


[
log
(
φhQ1,P2b
φ
g
Q1,P2b
)
1A2
]+
 (18)
When h˜k and g˜k have Rayleigh distribution
P¯1 = P1ae
−
τ1
γ¯h
1 e
−
τ2
γ¯h
2 + P1be
−
τ1
γ¯h
1 (1 − e
−
τ2
γ¯h
2 )
+Q1e
−
τ2
γ¯h
2 (1− e
−
τ1
γ¯h
1 ), (19)
P¯2 = P2ae
−
τ1
γ¯h
1 e
−
τ2
γ¯h
2 + P2be
−
τ2
γ¯h
2 (1− e
−
τ1
γ¯h
1 )
+Q2e
−
τ1
γ¯h
1 (1 − e
−
τ2
γ¯h
2 ). (20)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare the sum rates obtained via
the different power control schemes proposed in this paper.
The receiver’s AWGN noise has variance 1. The fading for
each channel is Rayleigh distributed with parameters γh1 =
γh2 = γ
g
1 = γ
g
2 = 1. The sum rates are plotted in Fig.1
for different powers P1 = P2. We observe that cooperative
jamming substantially improves the sum-rate (up to 75%). Of
course, for each case knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI
at the transmitter improves the sum-rate. At high SNR, the
cooperative jamming can provide sum-rate without CSI higher
than the full CSI case without cooperative jamming. Also,
optimal ON/OFF power control is sufficient to recover most
of the sum rate achievable by a policy (for no eavesdropper’s
CSI and no jamming, ON/OFF provides sum-rate very close
to the optimal algorithm in that scenario).
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we provide achievable secrecy sum-rate in a
fading MAC with an eavesdropper when the eavesdropper’s
channel is not known to the transmitter. We obtain the power
controls that optimize the secrecy sum-rate. We also obtain the
power control when cooperative jamming is also employed.
It is shown that cooperative jamming can substantially im-
prove the secrecy sum-rates. We, then, obtain more easily
computable ON/OFF power control schemes which provide
secrecy sum-rates close to the optimal.
It is shown that via these techniques, one can recover most
of the secrecy sum-rate achievable with the perfect knowledge
of the CSI of the eavesdropper.
For future work one can consider the schemes when partial
CSI of the legitimate receiver’s channel is available at the
transmitter.
[Power Control]
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREMS
A. Proof of theorem 1
We sketch the outline of proof for sum-rate only, the
proof of single user rate follows on the similar lines. We
quantize h1, h2, g1 and g2 into uniform bins as defined in
[14], i.e {h1}q
h
1
i1=1
, {h2}
qh2
i2=1
, {g1}
q
g
1
j1=1
and {g2}
q
g
2
j2=1
where
h1 ∈ [0,Mh1 ], h2 ∈ [0,M
h
2 ], g1 ∈ [0,M
g
1 ] and g2 ∈ [0,M
g
2 ]
Also let
H(i1, i2)={h:h1,i1 ≤ h1 ≤ h1, i1 + 1, h2,i2 ≤ h2 ≤
h2, i2 + 1}
G(j1, j2)={g:g1,j1 ≤ g1 ≤ h1, j1 + 1, g2,j2 ≤ g2 ≤
g2, j2 + 1} Also we define S(i1, i2, j1, j2) = H
⋃
G
We say that a channel is in state si1,i2,j1,j2 if (h,g)∈
S(i1, i2, j1, j2) We define quantized power control policy as
Pk(h) = inf
h∈H
Pk(h) (21)
It can be easily shown that (??) implies that (21) also
satisfies power constraint. Now for a particular quantized
state, we have a Gaussian MAC-WT whose rate region is
characterized in [20]. In particular, the sum-rate is bounded
as:
R1+R2 ≤ rsum =
1
2
[
log
(
1 + h1,i1P1(h) + h2,i2P (h)
1 + g1,j1P1(h) + g2,j2P2(h)
)]+
(22)
Now the number of times the channel is in state si1,i2,j1,j2
Ns = nPr{(h, g) ∈ S(i1, i2, j1, j2)} ≡ nPr{si1,i2,j1,j2}
(23)
Now let Rsum = R1 + R2, the following rate is achievable
lim
n→∞
Rsum = lim
n→∞
Mh1∑
i1=0
Mh2∑
i2=0
M
g
1∑
j1=0
M
g
2∑
j2=0
rsum
Ns
n
(24)
=
Mh1∑
i1=0
Mh2∑
i2=0
M
g
1∑
j1=0
M
g
2∑
j2=0
rsumPr{si1,i2,j1,j2} (25)
Due lack of space we omit some steps, one can easily prove
also that average probabililty of error also vanishes i.e
lim
n→∞
P¯e ≤
Mh1∑
i1=0
Mh2∑
i2=0
M
g
1∑
j1=0
M
g
2∑
j2=0
P¯e(i1, i2, j1, j2)Pr{si1,i2,j1,j2} = 0
(26)
Now one can show that the optimal power control policy
given in theorem 1 achives this sum-rate Roptsum given by
Roptsum=∫ ∞
τ1
∫ ∞
τ2
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[
log
(
1 + h1P1 + h2P2
1 + g1P1 + g2P2
)]+
φ(H)dH
(27)
For that we need to show that for a given ǫ >
0 ∃Mh1 ,M
h
2 ,M
g
1 ,M
g
2 s.t
Mh1∑
i1=0
Mh2∑
i2=0
M
g
1∑
j1=0
M
g
2∑
j2=0
rsumPr{si1,i2,j1,j2} ≥ R
opt
sum − ǫ (28)
One can easily show the Roptsum is finite. Then by invoking
Dominated convergence theorem along the same lines as done
in [14] the achievability of sum-rate with the optimal power
control policy is proved.
B. Proof of theorem 2
The proof follows along the same lines as in theorem 1
since from [22] we know that when full CSI of eve’s channel
is known, the optimal power control policy is that one user
can either transmit or jam but not both at a time. Hence we
can use same arguments as in proof of theorem 1 to prove the
achievability of secrecy sum-rate, which we omit here due to
lack of space.
APPENDIX B
OPTIMAL POWER CONTROL
A. Without Cooperative Jamming
We provide the optimal power control policy without
cooperative jamming for Rayleigh fading. Similarly one can
obtain the powers for other distributions. Let f1 and f2 denote
the densities of h and g respectively. For Rayleigh fading
case, averaging over all fading realizations of eve’s channel,
i.e., g1 and g2, which give positive secrecy sum-rate, we get
from Theorem 3.1
R =∫
h1
∫
h2
[
log
(
φhP1,P2
)
−
1
ξP1,P2
{P1γ
g
1θP1 − P2γ
g
2θP2}
]
f1(h)dh
(29)
where
φhP1,P2 is as defined in (8) and
ξa,b = aγ
g
1 − bγ
g
2 , (30)
θP1 = e
1
P1γ
g
1
[
Ei
(
1
P1γ
g
1
)
− Ei
(
1
P1γ
g
1
+
h1P1 + h2P2
P1γ
g
1
)]
,
(31)
θP2 = e
1
P2γ
g
2
[
Ei
(
1
P2γ
g
2
)
− Ei
(
1
P2γ
g
2
+
h1P1 + h2P2
P2γ
g
2
)]
,
(32)
and
Ei(x) =
∫ ∞
x
e−t
t
dt. (33)
After writing the Lagrangian and invoking KKT (Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker) conditions (which are only necessary here as
the objective function need not be concave [24]), we get
h1
φhP1,P2
+
1
ξP1,P2
{
θP1
P1
− γg1 +
α1
h2φ
h
P1,P2
+
P2 (α1 + α2)
φhP1,P2
}
+
P2γ
g
1γ
g
2
ξ2P1,P2
(θP1 − θP2)− λ1 = 0 (34)
h2
φhP1,P2
−
1
ξP1,P2
{
θP2
P2
− γg2 +
α2
h1φ
h
P1,P2
+
P1 (α1 + α2)
φhP1,P2
}
−
P1γ
g
1γ
g
2
ξ2P1,P2
(θP1 − θP2)− λ2 = 0 (35)
where λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrangian multipliers and
α1 = h2γ
g
1e
−
(
h1P1+h2P2
P1γ
g
1
)
, (36)
α2 = h1γ
g
2e
−
(
h1P1+h2P2
P2γ
g
2
)
. (37)
We solve this set of equations numerically for optimum
power policy:
1) If we find positive solutions for P1 and P2 from (34) and
(35), both should be transmitting with their respective
powers.
2) If we do not find positive solutions for both and h1 > h2,
we solve (34) for P1 with P2 = 0.
3) If we do not find positive solutions for both and h1 < h2,
we solve (35) for P2 with P1 = 0.
B. With Cooperative Jamming
A user can either transmit or jam. We have different
expressions of secrecy sum-rate based on whether the users
are transmitting or jamming. Averaging (11) over all the fading
realizations (g1, g2) if there is a positive solution P1 and P2
from (34) and (35), both users will transmit, and the secrecy
sum-rate is given in (29).
When there is no solution of (34) and (35) such that P1 > 0
and P2 > 0, and the channel of user 1 is better than that of
user 2, the secrecy sum-rate is
∫
h1
∫
h2
[
log
φhP1,Q2
φh0,Q2
−
1
ξP1,Q2
{P1γ
g
1 (βP1 − βQ2)}
]
f1(h)dh.
(38)
Similarly when the channel of user 2 is better than user 1, the
secrecy sum-rate is
∫
h1
∫
h2
[
log
φhQ1,P2
φhQ1,0
−
1
ξQ1,P2
{P2γ
g
2 (βQ1 − βP2)}
]
f1(h)dh.
(39)
where
βP1 = e
1
P1γ
g
1
[
Ei
(
1
P1γ
g
1
)
− Ei
(
1
P1γ
g
1
+ h1
γ
g
1
(1+h2Q2)
)]
,
βP2 = e
1
P2γ
g
2
[
Ei
(
1
P2γ
g
2
)
− Ei
(
1
P2γ
g
2
+ h2
γ
g
2
(1+h1Q1)
)]
,
βQ1 = e
1
Q1γ
g
1
[
Ei
(
1
Q1γ
g
1
)
− Ei
(
1
Q1γ
g
1
+ h2
γ
g
2
(1+h1Q1)
)]
,
βQ2 = e
1
Q2γ
g
2
[
Ei
(
1
Q2γ
g
2
)
− Ei
(
1
Q2γ
g
2
+ h1
γ
g
2
(1+h2Q2)
)]
.
Now the problem is to maximize the above objective func-
tions appropriately for each case. This function may not be
concave. Hence, KKT conditions are necessary but not suffi-
cient. We solve the equations obtained via KKT numerically
to obtain power policy.
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